Forms Liberate

Lon L Fuller's account of what he termed 'the internal morality of law' is widely accepted as the classic twentieth century statement of the principles of the rule of law. Much less accepted is his claim that a necessary connection between law and morality manifests in these principles, with the result that his jurisprudence largely continues to occupy a marginal place in the field of legal philosophy.

In 'Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon L Fuller', Kristen Rundle offers a close textual analysis of Fuller's published writings and working papers to explain how his claims about the internal morality of law belong to a wider exploration of the ways in which the distinctive form of law introduces meaningful limits to lawgiving power through its connection to human agency. By reading Fuller on his own terms, 'Forms Liberate' demonstrates why his challenge to a purely instrumental conception of law remains salient for twenty-first century legal scholarship.

1 Reclaiming Fuller
I Form and Agency
II What is Being 'Reclaimed'?
III About the Book: Method, Material and Structure
IV Outline of the Chapters
2 Before the Debate
I The Early Fuller: Positivism and Natural Law at Mid-century
II Eunomics: A 'Science or Theory of Good Order and Workable Social Arrangements'
III Navigating the Labels
IV Conclusion
3 The 1958 Debate
I Mapping the Debate
II Reclaiming Fuller through the Nazi Law Debate
III Fuller and Legal Validity
IV Conclusion
4 The Morality of Law
I Mapping The Morality of Law
II Hart's Review of The Morality of Law
III A Different Path?
IV Conclusion
5 The Reply to Critics
I Mapping the 'Reply to Critics'
II Generality, Efficacy and Agency: Insights from the Archive
III Reflections on the 'Reply to Critics'
IV Conclusion
6 Resituating Fuller I: Raz
I Fuller and Raz
II Raz on the Rule of Law
III Raz on Authority
IV Conclusion: Form, Agency and Authority
7 Resituating Fuller II: Dworkin
I Fuller and Dworkin
II The 1965 Essays
III Dworkin's Project
IV Fuller, Dworkin and Interpretation
V Fuller, Dworkin and Methodology
VI Fuller, Dworkin and the Value of Legality
VII Conclusion: Taking Form Seriously
8 Three Conversations
I Morality
II Instrumentalism
III Legality
Fuller and Shapiro: A New Conversation?
IV Conclusion

“There is much of interest in this book for any legal philosopher. It is good to see the various elements of Fuller's work brought together as a larger interconnected project; and the interweaving of published and unpublished materials is a useful aid to deeper appreciation and understanding.” –  T.R.S. Allan, The Cambridge Law Journal Volume 72, No. 3

“Rundle has written a beautiful book about the 'jurisprudence' of Fuller. This was to be expected for those who were already familiar with her work.
(Translated from the original Dutch)
” –  Thomas Mertens, Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy Volume 1

“...a highly informative and thought-provoking book, rich in detail, sensitivity and rigour. It succeeds admirably in its aim to re-orientate our understandings of Fuller's thinking, and leaves the reader with the desire to revisit and reflect anew on his central concerns.” –  Sean Coyle, Jotwell: The Journal of Things We Like (Lots)

“In her thoughtful and elegantly written book Forms Liberate, Kristen Rundle offers a host of valuable insights into Lon L Fuller's theory of law and its place within modern jurisprudential thought.” –  Noam Gur, Jurisprudence (Review Symposium), Volume 5, Issue 1

“In a rigorous, beautifully written and carefully designed monograph, Rundle draws on both Fuller's published works and archival material to reconstruct a number of Fuller's theses whose interest lies not just in their historical significance but also, and indeed primarily, in the role they can play in the contemporary debate in the philosophy of law.” –  Stefano Bertea, Jurisprudence (Review Symposium), Volume 5, Issue 1

“Rundle successfully reclaims Fuller from the distorted picture that arose in the wake of the Hart-Fuller debate and argues for taking the form of law seriously.” –  Wibren van der Burg, University of Toronto Law Journal, Volume 64, Issue 5